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trustees . . . and to ratify and confirm the acts of its board of trustees .. ."; and
found that the 1952 legislation confirmed these proprietary powers.
24
Judge Van Voorhis writing for the minority felt that the only issue on
appeal was the validity of "Proposition Number One". He reasoned that it
was invalid because it combined three propositions - beach, parking and
recreation, and dredging - into one which is contrary to the prescriptions
of the town law. He also found the proposition to be invalid for its failure
to state the amount of obligations which the Town was incurring. As regards
the applicability of the 1952 legislation to the proposition and to the powers
of the Trustees, the minority contended that its only purpose was to quiet
title of the land held by and through the Trustees. In the minority's opinion,
the provision stating that the Trustees had the power to acquire real and per-
sonal property was limited to those acquisitions incident to the disposition and
conservation of property already held by the Trustees. And, though admitting
the Trustees had the power to sell the sand and gravel in the harbor, the
minority viewed the contract's primary purpose to be the improvement of nav-
igation which is a governmental function2 5 to be exercised by the Town Board
subject to proper approval.
Doubtless the Court went behind the issue presented by this case in
order to put an end to the attacks upon the acts of the Trustees. This writer
wonders, however, whether in attempting to settle one controversy the Court
has not planted seeds of others when it appears to be the purpose of the




Lipton v. Bruce' presented the Court of Appeals with two unusual and inter-
esting problems. Firstly, whether a deed of "one acre of land out of the above
described premises, or so much thereof as the party of the second part may require
for a cottage lot . . ." was an attempted conveyance, void for uncertainty of
description,2 a conveyance of an undivided interest, 3 or the conferral of a right to
24. The Court also found that this legislation did not violate the require-
ments of the New York Constitution which provides that no special law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title, N. Y. CONST.
Art. 111, §15 (1938); nor did it violate the Constitutional provision which states
that an existing law is not to be made applicable by reference, N. Y. CONST. Art.
111, §16 (1938).
25. See People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N. Y. 459, 113 N. E. 521 (1916).
1. 1 N. Y. 2d 631, 136 N. E. 2d 900 (1956).
2. Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563, 5 So. 104 (1888).
3. Morris v. Baird, 72 W. Va. 1, 78 S. E. 371 (1913).
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select one acre of land at a future time.4 Secondly, if it be construed as a right of
selection, could this right be validly exercised by executing and recording a deed
of one specifically-described acre by the original grantee to a third person.
On the first point, there was unanimity in holding that it was not an invalid
attempt to convey a specific acre. This was based on the accepted canon of con-
struction that the language of a deed should be read in such a way as to make it
valid and meaningful.5 All agreed further that the instrument created a right of
selection.
As to the second question, a divergence of views appeared. The dissent
argued that a right of selection could not be exercised unless the selection was
consented to by the grantor and followed by occupation, enclosure or cultivatiou.
The majority was of the opinion that such consent was unnecessary. They also felt
that a taking of possession was not essential to the valid exercise of the right.
The reasoning here was that the purpose of the requisite of possession was notice
to the grantor and this had been' accomplished by the recording of the deed.
Whether the right of selection is to be dependent upon the consent of the
grantor depends on the intent of the parties.6 Since here the grantor was the
grantee's mother and was that same day disposing of her interest in the property,
the majority's determination that no consent was intended seems well founded.
Further, it is a well settled principle that a man's grant is to be taken most
strongly against him.
7
Difficulties arise when one considers the majority's further holding that
recording gave constructive notice to all, including the person who was title holder
when the second deed was recorded four years after the right of selection had
been given. This statement is in direct opposition to the language of the statutes
and repeated judicial declarations,9 limiting the effect of recording to subsequent
purchasers and incumbrancers. It is doubtful that the Court intended to make
such a ruling. It is rather their expression of the fact that the deed was recorded
when the present defendant took title and that the deed under which he took
expressly subjected the grant to the right of selection.
The position of the Court, more accurately stated, Would be that although
4. Jackson ex dem. Garnsey v. Livingston, 7 Wend. 136 (1831).
5. People ex rel Myers v. Storms, 97 N. Y. 364 (1884).
6. Gray v. Producer's Oil Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 227 S. W. 240 (1921).
7. Jackson d. Troup v. Blodgett, 16 Johns. 172 (1819).
8. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §291: ". . . Every such conveyance not so
recorded is void as against any person who subsequently purchases or acquires
by exchange, or contracts to purchase or acquire by exchange, the same real
property or any portion thereof. . ...
9. Tarbell .v. West, 86 N. Y. 280 (1881); Seely v. Seely, 164 App. Div. 650,
150 N. Y. Supp. 66 (3d Dep't 1914).
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the selection was invalid as to the person who was then the title holder, because
of want of notice, this invalidity was cured when the title holder, in his grant,
recognized the right. The grantee of this later deed was chargeable with notice
because the deed was by that time on record in the County Clerk's office.
Easement by Implication
In Weil v. Atlantic Beach Holding Corp.,'0 deeds to lots in a beach
area referred to cover maps of a subdivision which included proposed streets
and a boardwalk. A perpetual right to use the beach for bathing purposes
was expressly reserved to the respective owners.
Ten years before this action in equity upon a claim of easement was
initiated, the boardwalk fell into disrepair and subsequently closed. The area
has since been redeveloped. Before the redevelopment, a party-defendant con-
structed a fence across one section of the boardwalk although property owners
were not interrupted in their free access to the same. In addition, a portion
of the walk was removed by said party who constructed an alternative route.
Access to this section of the walk was the subject of an appeal by residents
of the community.
The Court sustained the easement, and affirmed the holding of the Ap-
pellate Division that the defendant must remove the fences barring access
to the aforementioned portion of the walk. It further held that property
owners in the beach area have implied easements over and upon unde-
veloped roadways indicated by the cover maps.
An implied easement is an easement resting upon the principle that,
where the owner of two or more adjacent lots sells a part thereof, he grants
by implication to the grantee all those apparent and visible easements which
are necessary for the reasonable use of the property granted."1 It has been
held that purchasers upon a representation that land from the lake shore to
water's edge should be used in common, could not be deprived of such right.l
Although some state courts have indicated that mere convenience is
not enough, and have required the easement to be strictly necessary to the
principal thing granted,la New York supports a more liberal view, holding
that so far as their existence adds to the value of the property sold and
10. 1 N. Y. 2d 20, 133 N. E. 2d 505 (1956).
11. Farley v. Howard, 33 Misc. 57, 68 N. Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1900);
Sabatino v. Vasareli, 264 App. Div. 742, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 635 (2d Dep't 1942).
12. Boughton v. Baldwin, 134 Misc. 34, 235 N. Y. Supp. 98 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
13. McSweeney v. Commonwealth, 185 Mass, 371, 70 N. E. 429 (1904).
